Newcomers Rescue League

I am no liar becket.

it was truly a worthless reason for him to kill her.aanother example of ego destroys life.
I am still crying for the harm that he did to a young woman that I have loved for these 7 yers,simply because when i bought her a tedyy bear.she hugged that bear so close.Daddy has finally come home to em.and he loves meshe has had such a hrd life.i try hard to not get angry with her.i understand her pain her years of waiting fro daddy to say that he lived her.What he did will be punidhed.As is written in teh i Ching'the superior man surrenders it ti heaven."Christian bible."Vengeance is mine.Saith the Lord."Or i would,myself pay to have him kiled.

No idea, but I assume he would not have been shot by Scott Roeder. What I want to know though is what is the nature of a belief. How does a belief exist, if at all? What does it mean for something to be "real?" In logic, it is impossible for one thing to have contradictory properties at the same time. Can a person hold contradictory beliefs? If so, what does that tell us about the ontological nature of beliefs?

Perhaps this might give you a better picture of where I am coming from:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/

Some philosophers have denied the existence of beliefs altogether. This view, generally known as eliminativism, has been most prominently advocated by Churchland (1981) and Stich (in his 1983 book; he subsequently moderated his opinion). On this view, people's everyday conception of the mind, their “folk psychology”, is a theory on par with folk theories about the origin of the universe or the nature of physical bodies. And just as our pre-scientific theories on the latter topics were shown to be radically wrong by scientific cosmology and physics, so also will folk psychology, which is essentially still pre-scientific, be overthrown by scientific psychology and neuroscience once they have advanced far enough.

According to eliminativism, once folk psychology is overthrown, strict scientific usage will have no place for reference to most of the entities postulated by folk psychology, such as belief. Beliefs, then, like “celestial spheres” or “phlogiston”, will be judged not actually to exist, but rather to be the mistaken posits of a radically false theory. We may still find it convenient to speak of “belief” in informal contexts, if scientific usage is cumbersome, much as we still speak of “the sun going down”, but if the concept of belief does not map onto the categories described by a mature scientific understanding of the mind, then, literally speaking, no one believes anything.

Instrumentalists about belief regard belief attributions as useful for certain purposes, but hold that there are no definite underlying facts about what people really believe, or that beliefs are not robustly real, or that belief attributions are never in the strictest sense true (these are not exactly equivalent positions, though they are closely related). One sort of instrumentalism—what we might call hard instrumentalism—denies that beliefs exist in any sense. Hard instrumentalism is thus a form of eliminativism, conjoined with the thesis that belief-talk is nonetheless instrumentally useful (e.g., Quine 1960, p. 221 [but for a caveat see p. 262–266]). Another type of instrumentalism, which we might call soft instrumentalism, grants that beliefs are real, but only in a less robust sense than is ordinarily thought. Dennett (1991) articulates a view of this sort. Consider as an analogy: Is the equator real? Well, not in the sense that there's a red stripe running through the Congo; but saying that a country is on the equator says something true about its position relative to other countries and how it travels on the spinning Earth. Are beliefs real? Well, not perhaps in the sense of being representations stored somewhere in the mind; but attributing a belief to someone says something true about that person's patterns of behavior and response. Beliefs are as real as equators, or centers of gravity, or the average American. The soft instrumentalist holds that such things are not robustly real (if that makes sense)—not as real as mountains or masses or individual, actual Americans. They are in some sense inventions that capture something useful in the structure of more robustly real phenomena; and yet at the same time they are not mere fictions. Soft instrumentalism in this sense comports naturally with approaches to belief such as dispositionalism and interpretationism, to the extent those positions treat belief attribution simply as a convenient means of pointing toward certain patterns in a subject's real and hypothetical behavior.

that he wasn't a crazy bastard.

My point, becket, is that belief systems can cause people to take actions that are harmful. And flying airplanes into buildings were actions taken because of a belief system. That is my belief, that is my opinion and I will express that opinion.

The analogy to a tuna sandwich is absurd.